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Cultural diversity remains a key challenge for the justification and application of universal 
human rights norms. Many human rights theorists and practitioners insist that the continuing 
normative legitimacy of human rights norms depends upon the doctrine’s capacity to 
accommodate a very broad range of culturally-based ways of being and believing. In order to  
enjoy genuinely universal credibility, human rights are required to affirm the manifest diversity 
of human life, which, in turn, entails a thorough engagement with the differing empirical 
realities of suchhuman life. A core component of this affirmation of diversity is the defence of 
the right torights to cultural identity. So-called cultural rights have attracted renewed interest in 
recent years, in part because they appear to offer the promise of reconciling respect for 
universal human rights with a similar respect for cultural diversity. While recognising the 
growing need for human rights norms to constructively engage with cultural diversity, this 
paper, nevertheless, strikes a cautionary tone, and identifies one area in which the limits of the 
legitimate application of rights to cultural identity requires greater, more critical, attention. 
Specifically, the paper focuses upon the right of exit. The right of exit appears to provide an 
instrument by which legislative authorities can largely avoid the politically and conceptually 
fraught challenge of normatively evaluating traditions and practices, found within various 
cultural communities under their jurisdiction. The individual members of such communities 
are afforded the principal say over their continuing adherence to the community’s ways of 
being and believing. In this way, the right of exit appears to offer a normatively sound basis for 
a rights-based approach to cultural diversity, insofar as it enables, simultaneously, respecting 
individuals’ core normative commitments and respecting the terms of the various relationships 
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which define and bind their cultural membership. The legitimacy of any given cultural 
community mayy thereby be largely based upon individuals’ subjective deliberations. This 
paper will argue that a human rights-based evaluation of rights to cultural identity cannot rely 
entirely upon the principle that an individual’s’ lack of overt opposition to key defining and 
binding relationships, provides a secure basis for a rights-based response to cultural identity. By 
analysing the effects of some culturally-based practices and beliefs upon domestic abuse, the 
paper will demonstrate that some domestically-abused women’s ability to exercise their right of 
exit has been effectively severely disabled by the highly restrictive identities which their 
communities accord to them.
i
 It will be argued that, in some cases, the conditions which 
underpin such restrictive identities violate core human rights norms. 
Specifically, the  paper begins by considering anthe appeal to the relative universality of human 
rights norms as a means for reconciling human rights and cultural diversity. Cultural rights are 
then examined as a key element ofin the on-going concern of human rights theorists and 
defenders for recognising the value of cultural identity and belonging. The analysis examination 
of cultural rightss will particularly focus particularly upon ascribed identities as a core concern 
for those who defend the need for cultural rights. The discussion then focuses upon the 
conditional character of cultural rights, before proceeding to engage with the right of exit as a 
potential basis for grounding a commitment to recognising both cultural belonging, and, a 
continuing commitment to upholding individual sovereignty. The paper then turns to presents 
and analyses obstacles to individuals’ exerciseing of the right of exit, and outlines a condition of 
individuals’pays particular attention to a condition of being unable to leave. The paper 
considers a range of possible objections to this conditionsuch a claim and concludes by arguing 
that determining the grounds and limits to rights to cultural identity must include a due concern 
for the invidious forms of cultural harm.         
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Human rights and recognizing cultural diversity: relative universality 
Long periods of strain and discord have beset theThe marriageunion  between cultural diversity 
and human rights norms has endured long periods of strain and discord. The ideals upon 
which human rights norms have been conventionally based have attracted consistent criticism. 
Many have argued that personal autonomy, moral equality, and, even human dignity, are either 
too conceptually indeterminate to ground anything as tangible as international instruments of 
human rights law, or are ideals which originate in, and continue to reflect, the parochial and 
partial ways of being and believing which Western intellectual and political elites have typically 
(though all-too oftenand not always inconsistently) espoused.
ii
 There exist many long-
established cultural communities and civilisations which do not recognise the normative force 
of autonomy, equality, or the inherent dignity of all human beings. For some critics of human 
rights the existence of such human communities justifies and entails a rejection of what others 
defend as the culturally transformative potential of human rights. Through an appeal to a 
variously-conceived notion of cultural sovereignty, many defenders of such communities have 
argued that attempts at converting the members of such communitiesgroups to the doctrine of 
human rights is merelyamounts to the latest manifestation of cultural imperialism. On this view, 
the promotion of human rights and the unconditional promotion of cultural diversity are 
mutually exclusive.  This approach has been extensively criticised, and is continues to be 
affirmed by only a small number of theorists and practitioners.
 iii
  
While its most uncompromising claims have not been widely endorsed, some elements of the 
relativist cultural critique of human rights continue to influence the global human rights 
community and its approach to cultural diversity. Thus, many theorists and practitioners who 
are committed to the universal validity of human rights norms have, nevertheless, embarked 
upon a process of critical reflection upon the challenges which the recognition of sing cultural 
diversity raise for the founding and applying of human rights norms amidst diversity.
iv
 This 
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attempt to reconcile human rights with respect for cultural diversity extends to include 
theoretical and practical initiatives, ranging from political philosophers’ effortattempts to re-
establish human rights upon non-parochial normative foundations, to numerous institutional 
statements and declarations which proclaim the virtuous circle of human rights and cultural 
diversity. A discernible trend within human rights philosophy is towards paring down the 
catalogue of human rights to those which sufficiently reasonable, (or at least decent) peoples 
and individuals, might hypothetically endorse within the context of otherwise profoundly 
diverse ways of being and believing.
v
 Within institutional circles, the prevailing trend has 
included the formulation of various human rights declarations which explicitly address what 
someis considered to be the defining ethos of a given continent or region. It has also included a 
renewed interest in so-called cultural rights and the broader field of rights to cultural identity. 
Against those who argued that culture was, at best, irrelevant to defining the basis and content 
of human rights, and those others who insisted that recognising the determinative properties of 
culture entailed the rejection of the universal validity of human rights, there now exists a third 
constituency which insists that it is possible to enjoy the best of both worlds: to simultaneously 
affirm human rights and cultural diversity. After Jack Donnelly, I refer to this constituency as 
espousing a relative universalist understanding of human rights.
vi
  
Cultural rights: an expanding generation  
A key feature in the relative universalist reconciliation of human rights with cultural diversity 
consists of a renewed appreciation for what was once considered to be a poor relation within 
the family of international human rights: the category of cultural rights. While cultural rights 
have been integral to international human rights law from the very beginning of the  modern  
UN’s human rights system, their conventional designation as the so-called ‘third generation’ of 
human rights, underlines the difficulties their defenders have typically encounteredxperienced 
in their attempts at securing others’ recognition of cultural rightsthem as fundamental human 
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rights. However, the status of cultural rights has been enhanced through a series of significant 
institutional initiatives over the past three decades or so. Thus, the silo of internationally 
recognised cultural rights has been widened and deepened by the establishment of regional 
human rights declarations, such as the African Charter of Human and Peoples Rights (1986), 
the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam (1990), and, most recently, the ASEAN 
Human Rights Declaration (2012). In their respectively differing ways, each of these regional 
initiatives attempts to interpret universal human rights norms in ways which support and 
coincide with what is imagined to be the prevailing cultural ethos of each geo-cultural space. In 
addition, the UN has developed a series of human rights declarations which explicitly espouse 
the cultural rights of groups such as indigenous peoples and other minorities across the globe. 
The Vienna Declaration and Programme for Action (1993) has reaffirmed the UN’s 
commitment to protecting cultural rights. In a direct attempt to counter the claim that a 
commitment to human rights divides rather than unites civilisations, UNESCO has published a 
Declaration on Human Rights and Cultural Diversity (2001).  In 2009 the UN General 
Assembly established a mandate of the special rapporteur for cultural rights. Within regional 
human rights systems the rights of national minorities have been recognised by the Council of 
Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (1995), which adds 
to the European Convention of Human Rights and its recognition of cultural rights under 
Article 14. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has developed a protective regime for 
minority rights under Article 21 of the Inter-American Charter of Human Rights. Finally, 
cultural rights have been espoused by various civil society initiatives such as the 2005 Yogakarta 
Principles which are concerned with international human rights law covering sexual orientation 
and gender. The undeniablesheer importance of human beings’ access to, and enjoyment of, 
an extremely broad range of essentially cultural resources and goods is now unequivocally 
established within international human rights law.    
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Access to one’s own culture: rights to ascribed identities  
Underlying the vigorous development of cultural rights is a vast body of empirical evidence 
which demonstratestestifies to the extent to which systematic discrimination and inequality 
targets victims’ core identities and beliefs. Very few, if any, of us suffer discrimination because 
we are perceived as bearers of a faculty for pure reason or as the disembodied subjectsciphers 
of natural law philosophy. Protecting the human rights of those who suffer discrimination and 
inequality because of others’ vilification of their cultural communities’ ways of being and 
believing, thus requires foregrounding the core attributes of the targeted identities. Specific 
cultural rights to language, ethnicity, religion, gender, and the like, seek to enable some to 
possess and express the identities which others’ have sought to oppress or, in the very worst 
cases, eradicate. 
A significant part of the justification for the need for such positive protection rests upon 
recognising that many such identities can be integral to the deepest commitments of thosemany 
human beings who adhere to them.
vii
 Justifications for cultural rights must not be confused with 
cosmopolitanism’s vision of individuals’ identities as an amalgamation of diverse constellations 
of cultural elements and traits, which are, in some sense, consciously fashioned and constructed 
by individuals themselves.
viii
 In stark contrast, most defenders of cultural rights argue that many 
core elements of many individuals’ identities are neither particularly malleable nor consciously 
fashioned. Cultural rights are required precisely because many of us cannot simply renounce 
our culturally-derived identities and the commitments they are based upon. Such rightsThey 
draw attention to the harms suffered by many individuals who have been denied opportunities 
to speak their own language, worship their own idols, and generally commune with their own 
kind. All of which speaks to the fundamentally ascribed character of personal identity for many 
who seek the protection of cultural rights.
ix
 Many forms of human relationships and 
communality will be adequately covered by associative rights, the foremost example of which is 
Formatted: Font: Italic
Formatted: Highlight
Commented [FF10]: (Is ‘conceptual analysis’ the right 
term here? A minimal change would be ’conceptual and 
historical analysis’?) 
Commented [JF11]: Such rights  - if not they makes you 
think of those who can not renounce etc 
9 | P a g e  
 
such as, for example, freedom of association and its emphasis upon the essential voluntariness 
of many of our commitments and relationships.such associations. Cultural rights, however, 
testify to the limitations of seeking to found all relationships and communality upon such a 
model. Many individuals’ sense of self-worth and dignity are dependent upon enjoying access 
to their own, distinctive and non-substitutable communities. The growing body of 
internationally recognised human rights instruments speaks to the hopes of countless numbers 
of communities who wish to protect their beliefs, traditions and practices from external 
interference. Cultural rights offer an alternative to the Hobson’s choice scenario which has far 
too often accompanied many peoples’ exposure to homogenizing forms of globalisation. By 
supporting communities’ attempts to protect their own distinctive identities, cultural rights also 
aimserve to harmonise a commitment to human rights, with athe furtherance of  support for 
cultural diversity.     
The conditionality of cultural rights 
Cultural rights are indispensable to many peoples’ enjoyment of their own distinctive identities. 
However, as a sub-category of human rights more broadly, cultural rights are neither absolute 
nor intrinsically valuable. Despite some theorists’ insistence that the espousal of cultural 
diversity entails affirming a principle of cultural equality, cultural rights cannot be extended to 
protect all formally-established cultural traditions and practices, if they are, at the same time, 
are meant to be part of a human rights framework.
x
 There are identifiable cultural traditions, 
practices and beliefs which are manifestly incompatible with existing human rights standards 
and which should not enjoy enjoy any form of human rights protection. 
The possibility of some cultures harming some of their members is recognized by various 
human rights legal instruments and regional conventions, and is a particular concern within the 
field of women’s human rights. Thus, the UN Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) focuses extensively on the wrongfulness of many 
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established cultural practices. The CEDAW’s response to the place of culture in human rights 
makes a fundamentally important contribution to the understanding of the sources of human 
rights violations, by extending its focus beyond state institutions and actions by state bodies. 
Thus, Article 1 of the CEDAW extends the concept of discrimination beyond the public 
sphere and into social and cultural domains. Article 2(f) more specifically identifies states 
parties’ obligations to combat discrimination found within various cultural customs and 
practices. In this way, the CEDAW legally recognizes the iconic feminist insight, that the 
‘personal is political’, and thereby draws the cultureal sphere into the human rights regulatory 
domains. Subsequent to the Convention, the CEDAW’s Committee -- through General 
Recommendation 19 -- drew specific attention to the role played by traditional values, in the 
continuing discrimination and oppression many women across the world continue to suffer 
from. While the CEDAW sets a vital precedent in identifying potential forms of cultural harm, 
other UN human rights bodies have focused upon the importance of so-called traditional 
cultural and religious values, and their impact upon human rights. Thus, the Human Rights 
Council (HRC) recently initiated a specific study into the role of traditional values and human 
rights, and concludedconcluding that some such values are harmful to the more vulnerable and 
marginalised members of some communities, and reasserted reasserting that traditional values 
can never be legitimately elevated above human rights commitments.
xi
 Beyond the CEDAW 
and the HRC, other international initiatives recognize the harmful potential of many cultural 
practices, as evidenced by the Copenhagen Convention (1990), the Vienna Declaration (1993), 
and the Beijing Platform for Action on Women’s Rights (1995). Identifying some cultural 
communities’ specific traditions, practices and beliefs, as being harmful to the human rights of 
some of their members, provides the key ground  for specifying the limits of a human right to 
cultural identity.  
Hoping for too much and the potential appeal of a right to exit
xii
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The self-assurance and general airsense of certainty which characterise some human rights 
supporters’ specifications of the limits of rights to cultural identity, and the distinctly more 
conditional celebration of cultural diversity this entails, will resonate strongly with many 
peoples’ understanding of human rights as a fundamental tool for combatting injustice and 
oppression. However, others argue that the need to secure a sustainably normative agreement 
for human rights norms amidst extensive cultural diversity, entails justificatory approaches 
which are significantly less beholden appeal to thefar less normatively substantive criteria than 
those which instruments such as the CEDAW are based upon. On these alternative views, 
confronting diversity precisely entails that the global human rights community should not 
continue to hope for too much.
xiii
 For some, a continuing commitment to substantive gender 
equality as a key human rights norm places human rights at odds with very many established 
cultural ways of being and believing, and thereby threatens to undermine the moral 
appealuthority of human rights within such communities.
xiv
 It is thereby argued that, by insisting 
upon gender equality as a non-negotiable human rights norm, some within the human rights 
community run the risk of setting normative aspirations too high; of hoping for too much from 
human rights.  
Philosophical calls to limit the normative substance of human rights are not likely to induce a 
corresponding unpicking of international human rights law, nor lead to the abandonment of the 
CEDAW and other instruments which some states have taken issue with.
xv
 However, the 
defence of human rights has nothing to gain by complacency, and othergenuine threats to the 
continuing authority of the global human rights system are  readily identifiablenot difficult to 
find: the regional, and increasingly global, influence of China, with  and its disdain for human 
rights; the renewed support enjoyed by anti-immigrant political parties in many Western 
democracies; and a growing perception among many electorates that support for human rights 
is a principle which has been foisted upon them by liberal, unrepresentative elites. We may not 
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be experiencing the so-called end-times or twilight of human rightsxvi, but some philosophers’ 
insistence that human rights norms are too-demanding for some cultural communities, adds 
further weight to an emerging trend which aims at vernacularizing human rights norms. The 
potential value of according far greater significance to the right of exit should be understood 
within this context. 
 
 
The exit option: leaving it up to individuals to decide 
 
Vernacularizing human rights norms aims at re-establishing the moral authority of human rights  
upon foundations which are, simultaneously, acceptable to a broad and diverse range of 
different ways of being and believing, whilst retaining a sufficient concern for protecting 
individuals from oppressive forms of power. It hardly needs stating that such an objective is 
conceptually and, practically, profoundly complex. However, precedents exist.  
The right of exit has gained prominence over the past two decades precisely as a response to 
the challenge of regulating culturally diverse societies. Its appeal extends across different 
traditions of political and legal philosophy and it is a firmly established legal instrument within 
many jurisdictions.
xvii
 The right of exit option appears to offer many advantages for a human 




a) It is a right and is thereby entirely consistent with a rights-based approach to meeting 
this challenge.  
b) Many, particularly communitarian-minded, theorists argue that the right of exit offers 
sufficient assurance for those who worry that the collective rights entailed by a right to 
cultural identity might result in unduly restricting the basic liberty of some of the 
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community’s members. Thus, Bhiku Parekh and David Ingram insist that recognizing a 
right to cultural identity entails the acceptance of some forms of institutionalised 
collective rights, but that the right of exit enables dissident members to simply leave.
xix
    
c) It ostensibly complies with a core and widely-endorsed normative commitment which 
upholds individual deliberation as a fundamental good and serves to afford due respect 
to individuals as decision-makers.
xx
  
d) While endorsing the right of exit doesn’t entail taking a normative position on the value 
of cultural identity, for for many it appears  to be entirely consistent with recognizing the 
importance of cultural belonging to individuals.  
e) The right respects any given cultural community’s authority to maintain their own 
identity against internal dissidents who are in the minority.
xxi
   
f) It enables the state to avoid taking a comprehensively evaluative standpoint on the 
question of the value of individual cultures. Thus, while some advocates of a right of 
exit seek to formulate it in terms which entail the necessity of a prior commitment to 
personal autonomy or substantive equality, others formulate the right in ways which rest 
upon the empirical fact of whether or not any given individual wishes or does not wish 
to exit a community: the grounds for its exercise are thereby entirely subjective and are 
determined by individuals’ expressed wishes and preferences alone. The state is thereby 
not required to take an independently evaluative position on the necessary grounds for 
exercising the right.
xxii
   
For those seeking to vernacularize human rights principles in orderso as to better respond 
constructively to cultural diversity, the right of exit appears to provide a powerful resource and 
a potential ground for identifying the criteria for determining the value of any given cultural 
community: leave the task of judging cultures to their individual members and trust in their 
ability to know their own minds. The right of exit does appears to offer a powerful instrument 
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for the purpose of re-shaping human rights amidst diversity. A core motivation would be to 
extend the ethical appeal of human rights in such a way as to counter the claims that human 
rights principles unduly reflect Western, liberal values and ideals. In seeking to re-establish 
human rights on grounds which do not ultimately depend upon support from partial ideals, the 
right of exit approach obviously entails an acknowledgement of the right of many non-liberal 
cultures to exist. The very designation of some of these cultures as ‘non-liberal’ raises the 
possibility that the protection of some of their defining traditions, practices and beliefs, may 
require the suspension of some of their members’ human rights, especially, for example, some 
of the rights enshrined within the CEDAW.
xxiii
 On the face of it, this implication might cause 
some human rights defenders significant anxiety. Against this, maintaining the individual’s right 
to exit any community they have come to disapprove of, offers apparent reassurance against the 
prospect of cultural communities being afforded a carte blanche to oppress some of their 
members.
xxiv
 The right thereby seeks to uphold what is widely acknowledged as a fundamental 
value, which has profoundly influenced the development of human rights: individuals’ capacity 
for normatively deliberating upon their own commitments and core preferences.  From this, 
one can derive the following maxim: that if individuals do not seek to leave their cultural 
communities then there can be no legitimate basis for external interference or intervention 
within such communities. The individual right of exit might thereby become recognized as a 
core human right for withinwithin  a complex and diverse global order. 
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On being unable to leave 
Combining a right to cultural identity and a right of individual exit, under a single normative 
perspective, raises an interesting and highly importantsignificant issue. Recall that the strongest 
arguments supporting rights to cultural identity, focus upon ascribed forms of identity: ways of 
being and believing which many individuals themselves consider as, to be  effectively, 
irrevocable. However, the possibility of exercising the right of exit necessarily entails that 
individuals are capable of becoming estranged and alienated from such communities. In many 
cases the capacity to step back from one’s culturally-derived commitments and beliefs will be 
retained. Under such circumstances it is entirely reasonable that the commitments of those who 
choose not to leave should be respected. Even, perhaps especially, where, what they continue 
to affirm might appear to many outsiders as potentially intolerable. Individual sovereignty takes 
precedence. However, this approach rests upon an assumption that all of the individuals who 
have not sought to exit their communities may thereby be understood to have affirmed the 
community’s ways of being and believing. That not saying “no” amounts to consent. While the 
principle of respecting individuals’ normative deliberations is central to the philosophy 
underlying both human rights norms and the appeal to a right of exit as a basis for regulating 
cultural diversity, it should not be universally upheld – or so I argue. Setting the limits to a right 
to cultural identity upon the right of exit will, inadvertently perhaps, contribute to the 
persistence of ways of being and believing which are significantly harmful for some individual 
members. Moreover, in some instances, the right of exit will not suffice to prevent the harm, 
because what is harmed is precisely individuals’ capacity to effectively initiate any such course 
of action: they are largely unable to say “no”. Some individuals’ lack of overt opposition to their 
cultural fate is a consequence of the harm they are exposed to. A principle of respecting this 
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An established body of research has identified a socio-psychological phenomenon by which   
many women do not persistently oppose or object to what may reasonably be considered to be 
culturally intolerable practices and traditions, such as marital battering, dowry violence, the 
denial of legal standing generally to unmarried women, and genital surgeries.
xxvi
 The research 
indicates that many victims of such practices are effectively incapable of challenging or avoiding 
their fate. I shall examine this phenomenon by focusing upon domestic abuse. One particularly 
significant area concerns domestic abuse.  
Domestic abuse is a universal phenomenon and affects women and girls across a vast range of 
social and cultural determinants.
xxvii
 There appear to be no cultures in which women do not 
suffer domestic abuse. Despite its prevalence, in some jurisdictions, domestic abuse has only 
recently been recognized as a human rights violation in some jurisdictions.
xxviii
 In far too many 
states around the world, some cultural communities’ tolerance for, if not downright 
endorsement of, domestic abuse remains legally unchallenged.
xxix
  
Many victims of domestic abuse bring an end to their suffering by leaving the relationship. 
However, it is widely acknowledged that many other not all victims do not leave so. There are a 
multitude of factors affecting victims’ adaptive responses to their suffering and which offer 
generalised explanations for such apparently counter-intuitive behaviour. For many victims of 
domestic abuse the key obstacles to leaving are primarily material and include, economic 
dependency upon the abuser, the threat of homelessness, the lack of available shelters and 
refuges, and genuine fears for the effects of such disruption upon children and other family 
members. Put somewhat crudely, such obstacles might be compared with the so-called 
‘opportunity costs’ which some point to as a recurring consideration for anyone considering 
contemplating leaving a relationship or community.
xxx
 Opportunity costs will influence 
someone’s decision to leave but do but are not, by themselves, render someonea person 
unable to leave.  understood as disabling the very capacity for exiting.  
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A second, and deeper level of obstacle is more overtly psychological and consists of many 
victims’ identification with the role of a ‘battered woman’.
xxxi
 On From this approach, victims’ 
adaptive behaviour is not explained not primarily by reference to tangible material obstacles 
and forms of cost-benefit analysis. Rather, women are perceived as largely unable to leave as a 
consequence of rationalising their abuse as a comprehensible part of their lives and their fate. 
At this second level, cultural and religious factors may influence victims’ identification with the 
role of a battered woman, but they are not central to that process.   
A third level of obstacle locates the psychological condition of the battered woman within an 
overtly cultural and religious context. A thorough understanding of the specific force of cultural 
and religious obstacles to women not leaving abusive partners entails an appreciation of just 
how deep are their effects. Specifically, the effects of culture and religion are particularly 
powerful in respect of disabling many married women’s capacity to even initiate, let alone, 
effectively see through a commitment to leaving the relationship. While it is not present in all 
forms of domestic abuse, this third level of obstacle is of particular interest for this paper, given 
the extent to which it can effectively disable victims’ capacity to leave.
xxxii
    
Various authors have examined the effects of culture and religion upon domestic abuse.
xxxiii
 An 
important factor concerns many victims’ apparent acceptance of appeals to so-called ‘higher 
loyalties’. As Ferraro and Johnson write, ‘(w)hen the appeal to higher loyalties is employed as a 
strategy to cope with battering, commitment to and involvement with an ideal overshadows the 
mundane reality of violence.’
xxxiv
A Empirical evidence supports this claim. Specifically, the 
disabling effects of culture and religion are documented by two specific example of victims’ 
reconciliation with domestic abuse can be found in two recent studies into the experiences of 
some women of South Asian descent, living within the United Kingdom.
 xxxv
 Both studies 
identified a range of cultural and religious factors which explain victims’ apparent prioritisation 
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of cultural and religious imperatives over their own immediate interests in avoiding the abuse. 
Five different factors are identifiable within these studies. 
(1)  There exist cultural and religious barriers to women even initiating discussions about 
sexuality and thus, what may or not be appropriate behaviours within a sexual 
relationship.  
(2) There exist cultural obstacles to victims’ seeking help from within and outside the 
community, including well-founded fears of being excluded from the family and 
community if they reveal themselves to have been the victims of abuse.  
(3) The vocabularies of many South Asian languages do not include terms for designating 
forms of specifically sexual abuse, severely restricting some women from even referring 
to their experiences as ‘abuse’.  
(4) There exists a widespread cultural expectation of female obedience to their menfolk, 
and victims of domestic abuse are liable to being dismissed or blamed for causing their 
own abuse by not being sufficiently obedient. 
(5) The recurring cultural and religious mechanism underlying many of these barriers is the 




As one of the reports states, ‘there is a tendency to prioritise protecting the “honour” of the 
community over the safeguarding of vulnerable girls… it does appear that silence in the name of 
avoiding shame and preserving honour, is allowing men to continue operating with impunity, 
therefore fuelling sexual violence against girls and women further.’
xxxvii
  
Over 80% of the women studied in one of the reports explicitly referred to the fear of being 
disowned from by their family and community if they reported the abuse they suffered. One 
victim stated, ‘my own family didn’t let me disclose [the} my sexual violence [received]  from 
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my husband and I was emotionally blackmailed by them saying that I have a big mouth and 
don’t think about their reputation in the community. (They) also said that by religion you have 
to satisfy your husband’s needs.’
xxxviii
  
Another victim testified to the influence exerted by religious and cultural beliefs upon her own 
mother. She stated, ‘I was experiencing sexual and domestic abuse from my husband, and 
disclosed to my mum in the hope that she loves me and will protect me. Instead I was shown 
the main door and was told that the door is closed to me forever.’
xxxix
  
Finally, a Hindu victim of domestic abuse, from another report, described her conditions in the 
following terms: ‘my culture is like my blood-coursing through every vein in my body. It is the 
culture into which I was born and where I grew up, which sees the woman as the honour of the 
house. In order to uphold this false ‘honour’ and ‘glory’ she is taught to endure many kinds of 
oppression and pain in silence. In addition, religion also teaches that her husband is her god. 
Fulfilling his every desire is her religious duty. A woman who does not follow this path in our 
society has no respect or place in it. She suffers from all kinds of slanders against her character; 
she has to face much hurt entirely alone. She is responsible not only for her husband but also 
for his entire family’s happiness.’xl The internalization of cultural practices and expectations 




The right of exit has figured prominently in the arguments of some theorists who seek to 
reconcile a continuing commitment to a rights-based legal order with a respect for cultural 
diversity. The right appears to provide a means for pursuing the reformulation of human rights 
norms amidst diversity. Maintaining the right ensures that legislators don’t simply capitulate to 
any and all ways of being and believing, but that the act of evaluating the acceptability of such 
ways is fundamentally accorded to individuals. In this way, the value of individual sovereignty 
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may be upheldretained. However, all of this rests upon an assumption that individuals’ capacity 
for initiating the right of exit is largely, if not entirely, immune from the effects of the cultures 
some individuals develop their identities within. Returning to our specific examples, it entails 
interpreting women’s failure to seek to leave their communities as evidence that they continue 
to affirm the conditions they are exposed to. An alternative interpretation is that it is precisely 
their exposure to these particularly disempowering aspects of their cultural communities which 
accounts for why they do not leave, whilst simultaneously providing the basis for condemning, 
rather than condoning, those conditions.
xlii
 However self-evidently true this may appear to some, 
it is actually a deeply controversial claim within the context of theoretical engagements with 
cultural diversity. After all, the claim suggests that public authorities have to be more vigilant of 
some cultural communities than they are of others. It also clearly implies that one cannot 
assume that the apparent choices of some members of some communities are sufficiently 
sovereign; . oOne should, therefore, be cautious in proceeding down such avenues.
xliii
 However, 
the evidence above clearly challenges the assumption that procedurally upholding an individual 
right of exit provides sufficient insurance against forms of intra-cultural oppression and 
discrimination. 
 
Yes, but: cCountering objections and an alternative account of agency 
Various objections can be levelled at both my characterisation of culture, and of the victims of 
domestic abuse. It could be argued that the account of cultural harm which I present ultimately 
rests upon an empirically false conception of cultural community. To be trapped inside 
something presumes the existence of some closed, static and homogenous construction, which 
has rigid and impermeable boundaries. On this view, culture is conceived of as a “window-less 
box” fromout of which it is difficult for anyone, let alone vulnerable women, to exit.pass. The 
alternative to this view of culture is one which posits the inherent contingency and fluidity of all 
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 Separate cultures do obviously exist.
xlv
 However, their boundaries 
overlap in a series of highly complex matrices, so that many individuals’ identities will be 
significantly influenced by a broad range of cultural conditions. In these circumstances, exiting 
from one cultural community in order to enter others may often be a largely mundane act, 
which does not require elaborate or formal rites of passage.  
While the anti-essentialists can, I believe, exaggerate the presumed fluidity and contingency of 
all cultural communities, the key point can be acknowledged without thereby undermining the 
account of cultural harm presented here. Victims of domestic abuse will invariably pursue 
activities and relationships outside the realm of their immediate family and even the broader 
cultural community which is prepared to tolerate the abuse. They need not be entirely 
restricted to the single role of obedient wife to an abusive husband. However, some 
relationships and roles can be fundamentally constitutive of an individual’s sense of self-worth, 
and thereby strike at the core of their capacities for agency.
xlvi
 For women in particular, Wwithin 
some cultural communities for women in particular, being married is a condition of enjoying 
any form of recognition or status as a sufficiently mature member of the community. Where 
the status of being married grounds and, for some at least, ostensibly “validates” the treatment 
meted out by some husbands to their wives, it should not be difficult to see how this one 
relationship can be the source of so much harmful for some women. Of course, in many (but 
not all) cultures it is formally possible, at least, for women to initiate and secure a divorce 
without the prior approval of their husbands. In such communities, many women’s formal 
exposure to the form of cultural harm I have outlined, will be much less, or, non-existent. That 
said, divorce equality, if we can phrase it so, remains a remote aspiration for vast numbers of 
women across the globe. 
This does not necessarily entail that they are physically entrapped within some purportedly, 
utterly closed community, but rather that their freedom of deliberation and of movement are, 
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none the less, effectively restricted as a consequence of who their cultures expect and require 
them to be. Identity-forming, and maintaining relations, may not, necessarily, exhaust all of an 
abused woman’s activities and commitments, but may still have a significant impact upon core 
aspects of her identity and opportunities.
xlvii
  
Another objection to my argument could be that it relies upon a conception of the victim as 
being unduly pacified by the cultural conditions which confront them. As a consequence, 
perhaps, of some saviour mentality on my part, I have been too quick to depict many such 
women as passive victims in need of outside help. In response, no one should under-estimate 
the devastating effects of domestic abuse upon its victims. Nor does one need to be 
dogmatically Millian in one’s conception of what individual agency should entail, to raise 
legitimate objections to institutions which severely restrict many women’s fundamental rights 
within marriage. However, the objection really has a deeper significance and which takes aim 
atspeaks to the account of agency my formulation of cultural harm presupposes, and which 
might be seen as unduly pacifying those the condition is applied to. As has already been briefly 
acknowledged above, there are many overt, external impediments to women seeking to exit or 
escape from abusive relationships, which are themselves, in some ways, tolerated by elements 
of the wider cultural communities in which they are located. My account of cultural harm, 
however, goes further in seeking to identify how some women’s capacity to condemn and 
renounce such abuse, can itself be severely undermined by the cultural community from which 
their sense of self and identity is derived. 
One reason why many victims of domestic abuse to do not seek to exit abusive relationships is, 
as we have seen, that they internalize a diminished role allocated to themof themselves. Some 
women come to evaluate their sense of self-worth and dignity through their experience of being 
abused. The greater the tangible obstacles are to leaving the relationship and the culture, the 
increased likelihood of this belief, eir doing so will obviously be increased the greater the 
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tangible obstacles are to their leaving the relationship and the culture, although, of course, this 
diminished sense of self-worth and dignity can occur even where few such obstacles exist. 
Exercising the right of exit entails the capacity for an individual to conceive of herself as an 
agent capable of initiating a course of action that is inherently critical of the community she 
seeks to exit. In many cases, this condition will entail an individual conceiving of herself as 
possessing a worth and dignity independently of her cultural community and the fate accorded 
to her within it. In many cases this is no doubt possible, but the extent to which many victims of 
domestic abuse do not seek exit, serves to remind us of the need to allow for the possibility that 
not all individuals will retain this sense of worth and dignity. In order to confront the 
intolerable, one must have a sufficiently intact sense of oneself as being someone who deserves 
to be treated better
xlviii
.  
           This line of argument raises a further possible objection to the account of cultural harm 
I have outlined, and addresses a deeper philosophical concern about the constituents of agency 
more generally. The prevailing view, within much of the literature concerning the political and 
legal regulation of intra-cultural relations, remains the conventional vision of a sovereign 
individual agent whose capacity for normative deliberation, as opposed to what is tangibly 
deliberated upon, cannot be determined or significantly undermined by the cultural 
environments they inhabit. On this view, to respect another agent is precisely to understand 
them as constitutive ends and not the mere marionettes of some or other cultural forces. Of 
course, tThere is a vast body of literature on this subject, andof course. Hhowever well-honed 
and practiced are the arguments supporting this conception of sovereign agency, one of the 
most interesting challenges entailed by affirmatively responding to cultural diversity precisely 
consists of the, at the very least, tacitly, alternative understanding of agency this approach rests 
upon. To this extent, the account of cultural harm outlined here trades uponpicks out what 
defenders of a right to cultural identity do and must acknowledge: that is, an appreciation of just 
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how deep and significant are the effects of cultural community upon those who develop their 
identities within them. After all, a broader policy of respecting cultural communities is 
defended on grounds which range from the necessity of this policy for individuals’ exercise of 
personal autonomy and enjoyment of equality, through to being essential for upholding the self-
respect and purportedly inherent dignity of those who draw so heavily upon their cultural 
communities for orienting their way in the world. None of these arguments hold that the effects 
of culture upon individuals can only ever be skin-deep. Cultural attributes such as race, 
religion, gender, and ethnicity are thus integral to the construction of many peoples’ identities. 
In acknowledging this claim, one must at least countenance the possibility that some such 
attributes can constitute forms of harm as I have formulated that notion above. This is precisely 
what I have argued occurs in the case of domestic abuse and its effects upon some women’s 
capacity to initiate exit from their circumstances.
xlix
  
A Return to Human Rights 
I conclude by returning to briefly address the broader context of how human rights may  
respond to cultural diversity. Despite its continuing prevalence, domestic abuse is an 
acknowledged human rights violation. However, many victims do not seek to exit from the 
relationships and the wider cultural communities in which the abuse occurs. I have argued that, 
the fact that they don’t do so, provides further support for some of the central claims made by 
defenders of the right to cultural identity; that culture can, and often does, have a deeply 
influential effect upon members’ identities and sense of self-worth. While the vast majority of 
contributions to this literature focus upon the beneficial effects of culture’s influence upon 
individuals, I have sought to show that this is not universally the case. Indeed, given the 
prevalence of domestic abuse and the extent to which many cultures do not unequivocally 
condemn and seek to end such treatment of women, there is good reason to include 
consideration of how culture can invidiously support harm.  
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The appeal of a right to exit for a normative approach which seeks maximal respect for many, 
if not all, of the world’s cultures, in the name of a principle of respecting cultural diversity, is 
clear. Human rights defenders have been criticized on many occasions for advocating an 
alternative, more zealously interventionist policy towards “non-compliant” cultures. Responding 
effectively to the challenge of cultural diversity obviously entails the development of a far more 
sophisticated and nuanced approach to difference and to ostensive otherness. This paper has 
sought to contribute to that process of response and potential reform. Doing so from a 
perspective supportive of human rights requires, however, an extensive engagement with what a 
right to cultural identity may entail for some intra-cultural relations. Ultimately, a right to 
cultural identity cannot be a right to practice any formally-established cultural ways of being and 
believing, but rather to those which are compatible with, and supportive of, the self-respect and 
dignity of all of their members. Similarly, human rights cannot commit to defending cultural 
diversity as an end-in-itself, or what Kwame Appiah refers to as the ‘diversity principle’.
l
 The 
value of any given culture should be evaluated by human rights defenders on the basis of 
whether or not any given culture genuinely respects all of its own members’ sense of self-worth 
and dignity. A human rights-based approach to regulating cultural diversity cannot support 
cultural conditions which effectively entrap human beings within what Ralf Dahrendorf refers 
to as ‘communities of fate’.
li
  Whatever one’s view of the use and abuse of culture, it should be 
clear that any attempt to respond constructively to cultural diversity cannot be achieved by 
formulating regulative principles which would largely exclude concern for intra-cultural 
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i The paper thereby analyses the harmful potential of some cultural practices. The 
phenomenon of cultural harm remains largely overlooked in the literature, and warrants a 
comprehensive investigation. This paper focuses upon one of those aspects of cultural harm 
which is extensively researched, whilst acknowledging that its effects can extend to many other 
groups of victims.       
ii See the American Anthropological Association’s infamous ‘Statement on Human Rights’, 
American Anthropologist (1947), 49.  Pp? For an insightful analysis of the controversial nature 
of that statement see K. Engle, (2001) ‘From Skepticism to Embrace, Human Rights and the 
American Anthropological Association from 1947-1999’, Human Rights Quarterly, 23  ? For 
an excellent analysis of the question of the alleged culturally specific character of human rights 
principles see R. Panikkar, (1982) ‘Is the Notion of Human Rights a Western Concept?’, 
Diogenes, 120?? Interestingly, the UN General Assembly recently felt the need to recently 
reassert the universality of human rights principles. GA Resolution 67/1, 2012.  
iii
 See in particular, Pollis, A. & Schwab, P., (2000) ‘Human Rights: A Western Construct with 
Limited Applicability’, in Pollis, A. & Schwab, P. Human Rights: New Perspectives, New 
Realities, (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner), pp. 1-18. Makau, Mutua, (2003) Human 
Rights: a Political and Cultural Critique, (Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press). See 
also his ‘The Ideology of Human Rights’, in Virginia Journal of International Law, (1996), 36. 
iv A number of theorists have pursued this approach. See Charles Beitz, The Idea of Human 
Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). Jack Donnelly, (2007) ‘The Relative 
Universality of Human Rights’, Human Rights Quarterly, 29:2, pp. 281-306. John Rawls The 
Law of Peoples (Cambridge, Mass.; Harvard University Press, 1999) 
v See Fn. iii above. 
vi 2007. Op cit. 
vii
 A great deal of conceptual and historical analysis into the sheer significance of identity for 
individual well-being was initiated by the so-called “politics of recognition” perspective. See 
Charles Taylor’s publication Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition in Amy Gutmann 
(ed.) Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition, (Princeton. N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1994), pp. 25-74. 
viii For an example of the defence of such an account see Jeremy Waldron, ‘Minority Cultures 
and the Cosmopolitan Alternative’, University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, 25: 1992, 
751.   
ix A number of theorists have argued for rights to cultural identity in these terms. See Bhiku 
Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory, (2nd. Edition), 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2000). Avishai Margalit & Moshe Halbertal, (2004) ‘Liberalism and the 
Right to Culture’, Social Research, 71:3: 529-548. Joseph Raz & Avishai Margalit (1990). 
‘National Self-Determination’, Journal of Philosophy, LXXXVII(9): 439-461. Joseph Raz, 
(1994), ‘Multiculturalism: a Liberal Perspective’, in his Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in 
the Morality and Law of Politics, (Oxford: Clarendon Press), 155-76.  
x
 Mutua Makau makes this argument. Op cit. p. 109. 
xi
 Human Rights Council, Advisory Committee, ‘Preliminary study on promoting human rights 








27 | P a g e  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
xii The phrase ‘hoping for too much” is a reference to Joshua Cohen’s ‘Minimalism About 
Human Rights: the Most We Can Hope For? Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 12:2, 2004, 
pp. 190-213. 
xiii See Fn. iii above and Cohen (2004) op cit. 
xiv Charles Beitz (2009) op cit. pp.186-96 argues this.  
xv The CEDAW Committee has addressed the issue of excessive reservations in four separate 
General Recommendations. Recommendations No. 4 (1987), No. 20 (1992), No. 21 (1994) 
and No. 28. ? 
xvi A reference to two recent theses which herald the demise of what the respective authors 
consider to be the veritable hegemonic influence of human rights law. See Eric A. Posner, The 
Twilight of Human Rights Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) and Stephen 
Hopgood, The Endtimes of Human Rights (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013).  
xvii
 The right of exit figures most prominently in Chandran Kukathas’ attempt to reconcile 
liberalism with diversity. See his The Liberal Archipelago: A Theory of Diversity and Freedom, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). It also figures in the political theory advocated by 
Bhiku Parekh, op cit. and Will Kymlicka, op cit. Critics of the right include Leslie Green, op 
cit. and Ayelet Shachar (2001) Multicultural Jurisdictions: Cultural Differences and Women’s 
Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
xviii My discussion focuses upon the possibility of individuals exiting communities within a single 
sovereign state. As I write, countless numbers of people are risking life and limb in their 
attempts to seek refuge in other countries. The right of exit has little purchase in this context!.   
xix
 Parekh, op cit. David Ingram, (2013) ‘Group Rights: a Defence’ in Thomas Cushman, (ed.) 
Handbook of Human Rights, (New York: Routledge), pp. 277-290.   
xx This remains core to any discussions of the philosophical grounding of human rights norms 
and testifies to the influence which liberal philosophy exerts upon human rights thinking.   
xxixxi
 Amy Gutmann (1998) argues on these grounds. See her ‘Freedom of Association: an 
Introductory Essay’, in her Freedom of Association (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 
pp. 3-34.  
xxiixxii
 Joseph Raz, op cit. defends the right of exit as a means for promoting personal autonomy. 
Brian Barry (2001) Culture and Equality: an Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism (Oxford: 
Polity) grounds a right of exit on the ideal of equality. In contrast, Chandran Kukathas, op cit. 
excludes both autonomy and equality as necessary ideals for liberalism and offers the most 
uncompromising formulation of a subjective approach to the right of exit. 
xxiii
 This sentence touches the tip of an intellectual ice-berg concerning an assumption that  
Makau, op cit. is one of the strongest advocates of this view. 
xxiv Although this is to assume that such individuals will be able to relocate to communities or 
social environments in which a broader range of rights are recognised. 
xxvxxv
 As Peter Jones writes, ‘if cultures matter morally, it is because they matter to and for people 
and, if that is so, the issue of how people are to count morally must precede rather than follow 
our encounter with cultures.’ Op cit. . 45. My own concerns reflect those of Peter Falk in his 
insistence that practices which have ‘intolerable effects’ upon their victims should not be 
included in any formulation of universal standards. See Falk, (1992), ‘Cultural Foundations for 
the International Protection of Human Rights’, in A.A. An-Na’im, (ed.) Human Rights in 
Cross-Cultural Perspectives: A Quest for Consensus, (Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia 
Press), p. 49.  
  
xxvi
 See Elizabeth Zechenter (1997) ‘In the Name of Culture: Relativism and the Abuse of the 
Individual’, Journal of Anthropological Research, 53; pp. 319-47. Carolyn Hayter (1996) 
‘Female Circumcision: is there a Legal Solution?’, in P. Steiner and J. Alston (eds.) 
International Human Rights in Context, (Oxford: Clarendon Press). Arati Rao, (1995) ‘The 
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Politics of Gender and Culture in International Human Rights Discourse’, in J. Peters and A. 
Wolper, (eds.) Human Rights: International Feminist Perspectives, (New York: Routledge), pp. 
167-75.  
xxvii It has been estimated that within European countries, for example, one in four women 
experience domestic abuse during their lifetime, and between 6-10% of women in any given 
year. Within England and Wales during 2013/14, there were 1.2 million female victims of 
domestic abuse and it is estimated that around 30% of women will experience domestic abuse 
during their lifetimes. Council of Europe (2002) Recommendation of the Committee of 
Ministers to Member States on the Protection of Women Against Violence. Adopted on 30 
April 2002; and Explanatory Memorandum. Strasbourg, France, Council of Europe. 
xxvii
 Rachel Pain, ‘Everyday Terrorism: How Fear Works in Domestic Abuse’, (Centre For 
Social Justice and Community Action, Durham University and Scottish Women’s Aid, 2014); 
Oonagh Gay and John Bardens, Domestic Violence, (UK Parliament, Commons Library 
Standard Notice, Standard Notes SN06337, 2014); National Coalition Against Domestic 
Violence, (2014) Domestic Violence Factsheet. Accessed via 
http://www.ncadv.org/files/Domestic%20Violence%20Stylized--GS%20edits.pdf. 
xxviii For a summary of the legal recognition of domestic abuse as a crime see Andrew Fagan The 
Atlas of Human Rights: Mapping Violations of Freedom Around the Globe (Berkeley, CA.: 
University of California Press, 2010). 
xxix Despite the UN General Assembly’s Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against 
Women. A/RES/48/104 (1993). Article 1 of which defines ‘violence’ as including psychological 
harm.  
xxx See Kukathas (2003) op cit. pp. 109-113 for a discussion of opportunity costs.  
xxxi Thus, Lenore Walker has argued that many victims of domestic abuse do not leave because 
of a state of learned helplessness which results from enduring prolonged abuse. Some victims 
thereby begin to take on a role of the ‘battered woman’. See her The Battered Woman 
Syndrome (New York: Springer, 3rd. edition, 2009). Others have criticised this approach for its 
alleged failure to duly engage with the structural and social factors in domestic abuse. See 
Edward Gondolf and Ellen Fisher (1988) Battered Women as Survivors: an Alternative to 
Treating Helplessness (Lexington, MA.: Lexington Press).     
xxxii Clearly, many victims of oppressive conditions do challenge and fight against their ‘fate’. 
However, not all do so and this third level of obstacle aims to address this. My analysis here has 
been significantly influenced by the literature on so-called adapative preferences. See Jon 
Elster, Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Rationality, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1985), Gary Becker, Accounting for Tastes, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1996), Onora O’Neill, ‘Justice, Gender and International Boundaries’, in 
Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen, (eds.), The Quality of Life (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1993): 303-323. Cass Sunstein, ‘Preferences and Politics’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 
20:1, Winter, 1991: 3-34. James Griffin, Well-Being: its Meaning, Measurement and Moral 
Importance, Oxford: Clarendon, 1986). All of these authors posit the need to respond critically 
to expressed preferences and desires, in circumstances where there is a reasonable suspicion 
that the individuals’ preferences may be understood as adaptive towards unjust conditions. 
Sunstein states that ‘governmental interference with existing desires may be justified because of 
the origins of those desires.’ (‘Preferences and Politics’: 12). He further states that ‘respect for 
preferences that have resulted from unjust background conditions and that will lead to human 
deprivation or misery hardly appears the proper course for a liberal democracy.’ (ibid.) The 
adaptive preferences perspective is supported by a range of psychological studies which 
demonstrate what initially appears as an irrational response by the oppressed and 
disadvantaged to their own plight. Rather than developing dispositional attitudes and beliefs 
which directly challenge the legitimising narratives which support the status quo, there is 
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actually a marked tendency to accept and endorse these narratives so that, either no harm is 
perceived, or victims blame themselves for their plight. See Melvin Lerner’s work on Just 
World Theory, Lerner, The Belief in a Just World: A Fundamental Delusion, (New York: 
Plenum, 1980) and Major and Schmader’s studies into the cognitive construal processes which 
they describe as ‘chronic belief systems.’ See also Brenda Major and Toni Schmader, ‘From 
Social Devaluation to Self-esteem: The Impact of Legitimacy Appraisals’ in B. Major & J. Jost 
(Eds.), Psychology of Legitimacy: Emerging Perspectives on Ideology, Justice, and Intergroup 
Relations. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001): 177. All of which evokes Wilhelm 
Reich’s famous question: ‘what has to be explained is not the fact that the man who is hungry 
steals or the fact that the man who is exploited strikes, but why the majority of those who are 
hungry don’t steal and why the majority of those who are exploited don’t strike.’ The Mass 
Psychology of Fascism, (third edition), trans. Vincent Carfango, (New York: Farrar Strauss 
Giroux, 1971):53.          
xxxiii See A. Horton, M. Wilkins & W. Wright, Women who ended abuse: what religious leaders 
and religion did for these victims. In A. Horton & J. Williamson (eds.) Abuse and Religion, 
(Lexington, MA.: Lexington Books, 1988), pp. 235-245.  
xxxivxxxiv
 Ibid., pp. 330-31. 
xxxv
 See Muslim Women’s Network UK, Unheard Voices: the Sexual Exploitation of Asian Girls 
and Young Women, (2013) and Manjit Rehal and Sylvia Maguire, The Price of Honour: 
Exploring the Issues of Sexual Violence Within South Asian Communities in Coventry, 
(Coventry Rape and Sexual Abuse Centre, 2014). Both reports studied a number of women 
and other community members extending across Hindu, Muslim and Sikh religious 
communities and were authored by women from these communities. To reiterate, domestic 
violence is a global phenomenon and certainly is not only restricted to women of non-
European descent. I have chosen to specifically focus upon women of South Asian descent for 
several reasons: firstly, that many of them are immigrants into European countries (or the 
children of immigrants) and, combined with their ethic status, typically experience a greater 
sense of isolation from the wider community, which is a condition envisaged by the liberal 
archipelago. Secondly, that women from several religious communities, specifically including 
the Hindu, Muslim and Sikh communities, are nevertheless united in their exposure to a 
prevailing patriarchal set of beliefs and customs, which, although not universally endorsed 
within such communities, are formally upheld by recognizable tenets of these communities. 
Finally, that such women are also united in their exposure to the specific phenomenon of 
shame and dishonour which plays a highly significant role within a wider environment, one that 
serves to disable women’s ability to combat their abuse.   
xxxvi
 Cultures undoubtedly change and are not entirely static. However, some core elements of 
some cultures appear more resistant to change, which is clearly the case with the aversion to 
shame and dishonour within many such communities. For a highly detailed and sophisticated 
philosophical analysis of the social regulation of meaning see Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation 
of Social Meaning, University of Chicago Law Review, 62:3 (1995): 943-1045.  
xxxvii
 Unheard Voices, p. 28. 
xxxviii
 The Price of Honour, p. 10. 
xxxix
 Ibid., p. 11. 
xlxl
 Cited in Gita Saghal (1992), ‘Secular Spaces: the Experiences of Asian Women Organizing’, 
in G. Saghal & N. Yuval-Davis, (eds.) Refusing Holy Orders: Women and Fundamentalism in 
Britain, (London: Virago Press), 196-97, p. 188. This quotation comes from a woman who 
killed her husband after enduring ten years of physical abuse. It is important to iterate that the 
testimonies of the victims presented above are not claimed to provide the essential truth about 
such communities. After all, there are far more families in which domestic abuse and sexual 
assault do not occur. What they are intended to show is how powerful, for some, is the 
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perception that culture and religion serve to restrict women testifying to their abuse or, for 
current purposes, working to prevent women from electing to leave in order to avoid their 
suffering.       
xli It is important to stress at this point that my choice of the focus upon women, and the 
subsequent critique I outline, does not explicitly entail or depend upon, the kind of essentialist 
vision most readily associated with Susan Moller Okin’s ground-breaking contribution to the 
debate surrounding the effects of multiculturalism upon women. See her “Is Multiculturalism 
Bad for Women?” Boston Review, 22, (1997): 25-28. My own position is closer to the more 
nuanced account of women’s identities and interests expounded by Ayelet Shachar, 
Multicultural Jurisdictions: Cultural Differences and Women’s Rights, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000). Still, I am more concerned than Shachar about the potential of cultural 
conditions to colonize some individuals’ sense of self. 
xlii As Leslie Green writes, ‘it is risky, wrenching and disorienting to have to tear oneself from 
one’s religion or culture; the fact that it is possible to do so does not suffice to show that those 
who do not manage to achieve the task have stayed voluntarily.’ ‘Internal Minorities and Their 
Rights’, Will Kymlicka (ed.) The Rights of Minority Cultures, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1995), pp. 257-71: 266. Note however that my account of this third level of obstacle goes 
beyond Green’s understanding of obstacles to exit.    
xliii Some theorists such as, for example, Bhiku Parekh (op cit.) argues that we should never 
proceed down such paths since to do so is fundamentally disrespectful towards such cultures. 
xliv One of the first and most powerful challenges to this traditional, window-less box, concept of 
culture was articulated by Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures, (New York: Basic 
Books, 1973). For an excellent discussion of how various concepts of culture have affected 
legal and political approaches to cultural diversity, see Sunder, op cit. 
xlv After all, if they did not, what would the right to cultural identity actually protect in any 
specific instance? 
xlvi
 Various authors have stressed the importance of self-worth to human well-being. See Paul 
Benson, for example. See his ‘Free Agency and Self Worth’, Journal of Philosophy, 91:12, 
(Dec. 1994): 650-668. See also Catriona Mackenzie, ‘Imagining Oneself Otherwise’, in 
Mackenzie and Stoljar, (eds.) Relational Autonomy, 124-150.    
xlvii
 Thus, it would be possible for a woman to be said to suffer from significant forms of cultural 
oppression, to the extent that these primarily impact upon her status as a married or 
marriageable woman, in cultures where being married is a key, but not exclusive, component of 
her identity and of her subsequent options and opportunities. It should be pointed out that my 
specific focus here is upon the possible existence of forms of oppression which have a 
discernible cultural basis and character, which suggests a particular formal and identifiable set 
of attributes. It is reasonably conceivable, specifically in respect of domestic abuse, that many 
women are also similarly ‘disabled’ by the abuse they suffer, and are similarly unable to resist 
their suffering, but where the underlying causes of the abuse are less discernibly or singularly 
cultural.  
xlviii
 As Mackenzie, op cit. p. 140 writes, ‘without a sense of her own worthiness as an agent and 
of the worthiness of her capacities, her desires, and her beliefs, an agent will not be able to 
conceive of herself as capable of effective action.’ 
xlixxlix
 Parekh exemplifies an understanding of culture as deeply influential upon the construction 
of individuals’ identities. However, he insists that harm can only occur if individuals experience 
it in these terms as ‘harm’. He even applies this test to cases of female genital mutilation. Op 
cit. . 275.    
l
 Kwame Anthony Appiah (2005) The Ethics of Identity (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press), p. 150. 
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li Ralf Dahrendorf, Life Chances: Approaches to Social and Political Theory, (Chicago: 
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